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ABSTRACT
In the experimental module of the AHEAD 1995 data, the sample is randomly split into respondents
who get an open-ended question on the amount of total family consumption - with follow-up
unfolding brackets (of the form: is consumption $X or more?) for those who answer “don’t know”
or “refuse” - and respondents who are immediately directed to unfolding brackets. In both cases, the
entry point of the unfolding bracket sequence is randomized. These data are used to develop a
nonparametric test for whether people make mistakes in answering the first bracket question,
allowing for any type of selection into answering the open-ended question or not. Two well-known
types of mistakes are considered: anchoring and yea-saying (or acquiescence). While the literature
provides ample evidence that the entry point in the first bracket question serves as an anchor for
follow-up bracket questions, it is less clear whether the answers to the first bracket question are
already affected by anchoring. We reject the joint hypothesis of no anchoring and no yea-saying at















Item non-response in survey data is a well-known problem, particularly if questions relate 
to sensitive information that respondents are not willing to provide or to information that 
respondents do not know exactly and find hard to estimate.  Examples are the amounts 
invested in saving accounts or the value of assets such as stocks and bonds, or the value 
of total family income or consumption. Item non-response becomes particularly 
problematic if the information is not missing at random, i.e., if the probability of not 
responding correlates with the amount in question conditional on a set of always 
observed covariates. See, for example, Manski (1989, 1995) and Little and Rubin (2002, 
Chapter 15). 
  Follow-up bracketing questions are often used to reduce the loss of information 
due to item non-response and to extract at least partial information from initial non-
respondents. See, for example, Juster and Smith (1997). Particularly in telephone 
interviews where it is difficult to show range cards on which respondents can choose in 
one step from a larger number of categories, unfolding brackets can be used to collect 
banded information. For example, a respondent who answers “don’t know” or “refuse” to 
a question on total family consumption in the past month then gets the question “Can you 
say whether it was $2000 or more?” If the answer is affirmative, the next question is 
“Was it $5000 or more?” etc. 
  The majority of initial non-respondents typically appear to be willing to answer 
one or more unfolding bracket questions, making unfolding brackets a useful tool to 
collect at least some information from the initial non-respondents (Juster and Smith, 
1997). Several experiments, however, have shown that the distribution of the categorical 
answers obtained in an unfolding bracket design depends on the order in which the 
bracket points are presented. For example, if the first question is “Was it $ 2000 or 
more?” i.e., the entry point is $2000, the distribution gives more weight to the high 
consumption outcomes than if the entry point were $500. A psychological explanation is 
that if people are unsure about the exact amount, the entry point will serve as an anchor 
that provides some information about their own amount. This phenomenon is known as 
anchoring (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).   3
  The literature shows that anchoring exists and becomes more prominent the more 
uncertain the respondent is about the exact answer (see, for example, Jacowitz and 
Kahneman, 1995). In order to use the answers to unfolding bracket questions for 
meaningful analysis, the possibility of an anchoring bias needs to be taken into account. 
Several models for what the answers to bracket questions look like if they suffer from 
anchoring have been introduced and estimated, using different sources of experimental 
data with random entry points. Examples are Hurd et al. (1998), Herriges and Shogren 
(1996), and Cameron and Quiggin (1994). A comparison between competing models for 
anchoring, however, has not yet been performed. 
  In this paper, some existing models for anchoring are considered and their 
implications are analyzed for differences between the true distribution of the variable of 
interest and the distribution obtained if anchoring according to a given model is present. 
Experimental data on household consumption from the AHEAD 1995 survey will then be 
used to test some of these implications. The specific feature of these experimental data on 
total family consumption is that the sample is randomly split in respondents that start 
with an open question - and get follow-up brackets if they do not answer that - and 
respondents who are immediately directed to the unfolding bracket questions without 
being asked an open question (see Hurd et al., 1998). Although in the first sub-sample 
initial non-response is substantial and respondents to the open-ended question are 
probably not a random sub-sample, it will be shown that comparing the combined 
distribution of open responses and bracket responses in the first sub-population with the 
distribution in the sub-population of immediate bracket responses provides a test for 
certain types of anchoring. 
  Another problem that leads to incorrect answers in an unfolding bracket design is 
acquiescence or “yea- saying” This is the problem that people have a tendency to answer 
yes rather than no. See Schuman and Presser (1981) or Hurd (1999). It implies that 
answers may depend on the wording of the question. For example, the number of “yes” 
answers to the question “Was it 2000 or more?” will be higher than the number of “no” 
answers to the question “Was it less than 2000?”  The design of the experimental data 
used here makes the answers vulnerable to yea-saying.   4
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, some 
existing models for anchoring are reviewed. In Section 3, we describe the experimental 
data. Section 4 explains how these data can be used to distinguish between anchoring 
models in a simple, nonparametric framework. This is applied in Section 5. In sections 4 
and 5, full non-respondents who provide neither open-ended nor bracket information are 
discarded. Section 6 takes them into account, using Manski’s worst-case bounds (Manski 
1989). Section 7 incorporates a simple way of “fixed probability” anchoring and 
acquiescence in the model and leads to the conclusion that acquiescence alone can 
explain the rejections in Section 5. Moreover, it shows that ignoring the acquiescence 
problem leads to misleading conclusions about selectivity of open-ended answers and the 
distribution of consumption that we are ultimately interested in. It also looks at estimates 
of the acquiescence problem for different groups, defined by, for example, education 
level or memory skills. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Anchoring Models and Acquiescence Bias 
An intuitively appealing anchoring model is the fixed-point model used by Herriges and 
Shogren (1996), Hurd (1997), O’Connor et al. (1999), and Hurd et al. (2001). In this 
model, the entry point E in the first bracket question serves as an anchor for follow-up 
questions. In the second bracket question the respondent does not compare E to the true 
amount Y, but to the weighted mean Y* = (1-a)Y + aE for some a between 0 and 1. The 
intuition is that the respondent is uncertain about the true amount. The entry point E is 
seen as an indication of what Y could be, and the respondent’s updated estimate Y* is 
drawn towards E.  Herriges and Shogren (1996) apply their model to data on willingness 
to pay for water quality improvement and find an estimate for a of 0.36, with standard 
error 0.14. They also discuss the possibility that a varies with Y and E. 
  An important feature of the fixed-point model is that answers to the first bracket 
question are not affected. Although the respondent’s estimate of the true amount will be 
drawn  towards  the  entry  point,  it  will  remain  on  the  same  side.  Thus  if  anchoring 
according to the fixed-point model is the only source of incorrect answers, answers to the 
first bracket question can be taken at face value. The fixed-point model can be interpreted   5
as a Bayesian model, where respondents update their beliefs about an unknown amount if 
new information (in the form of an entry point or other bracket point) arrives.  
  Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) and Green et al. (1998) find evidence suggesting 
that respondents already give biased answers to the first bracket question. For estimates 
of objective quantities as well as willingness to pay for public goods, they find that, for 
high entry point values, the proportion of bracket respondents who report that the amount 
is larger than the entry point value exceeds the fraction of open-ended answers larger than 
the entry point value.      
  Hurd et al. (1998) specify a parametric model that captures this phenomenon in a 
symmetric way, biasing probabilities smaller than 0.5 upwards and probabilities larger 
than 0.5 downward. The idea is that respondents do not compare the true value Y to the 
entry point E, but instead compare Y to E+e, where e is a mean zero error term, assumed 
to be normal and independent of all other components of the model. Hurd et al. (1998) 
use the same device also at follow-up bracket questions, with independent errors that can 
have a different variance. The model is called a gating model, since respondents have to 
pass a number of gates to reach their final bracket answer. 
  Somewhat  similar,  though  not  yet  applied  in  this  context,  are  the  models  for 
binary regression with contaminated data (e.g., Copas, 1988) or misclassification (e.g. 
Hausman et al., 1998). Assume that with some fixed “gating” probability P(Gat), people 
give  the  wrong  answer.  It  implies  P[“no”]  =  P[Y<E](1-P(Gat))  +  P[Y³E]P(Gat)  and 
P[“yes”] = P[Y³E](1-P(Gat)) + P[Y<E]P(Gat). If this probability does not depend on the 
true value and is thus the same whether the true amount is larger or smaller than the entry 
point, the reported probabilities will be too large if they are larger than 0.5 and too small 
if they are smaller than 0.5. 
  A direct test of yea-saying is preformed by Hurd (1999). He uses experimental 
data from the 1996 wave of the Health and Retirement Study, a representative sample of 
the US population aged 54-64 with their spouses. Respondents were asked “About how 
much could you sell your home for in today’s housing market?” They were forced into 
brackets  and  were  randomly  assigned  to  an  entry  point  (E=$50,000,  E=$100,000  or 
E=$150,000) and to a question format: “Would it be more than E,” “Would it be E or 
more?”  or  “Would  it  be  less  than  E  or  more  than  E?”  He  found  that  the  first  two   6
(unbalanced) formats led to many more “yes” answers than the third (balanced) format 
for  non-financial  respondents,  while  there  was  hardly  any  difference  for  financial 
respondents (i.e., the person in the household most knowledgeable in financial matters). 
He interpreted this as evidence of acquiescence related to uncertainty. Acquiescence bias 
is also a well-known problem in the willingness-to-pay (WTP) literature. For example, 
Boyle  et  al.  (1998)  find  evidence  of  yea-saying  for  bid  levels  in  the  upper  tail  by 
comparing open-ended answers and bracket answers on the WTP for a moose hunting 
site. On the other hand, Frykblom and Shogren (2000) used experimental data to compare 
open-ended  and  discrete  choice  answers  on  students’  WTP  for  a  book  (“The 
Environment”) and found no differences, leading them to conclude that problems with 
discrete  choice  answers  can  be  due  to  how  the  survey  is  framed  rather  than  to  the 
questions themselves.             
 
3. The AHEAD Wave 2 Consumption Experiment 
We use basically the same data as Hurd et al. (1998), who describe the data in detail. The 
AHEAD panel (Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old) is roughly 
representative for the US population over 70 and their spouses. The second wave was 
mainly done by telephone interviews in 1995. At the end of the regular survey, regular 
AHEAD participants were asked to complete an additional experimental module. About 
75% of all respondents were willing to do this. This is the sample used by Hurd et al. 
(1998) and for this study. 
  The participants in the experimental module were randomly separated into 7 
groups of approximately equal size. All these groups got some questions on household 
consumption in the last month, but the question format differed across the seven groups. 
Three groups (sample I) started with an open question: “How much did your household 
spend on consumption in the past month?”
2 Those who answered “don’t know” or 
“refuse” then got unfolding bracket questions, with different entry points for the three 
groups. The first unfolding bracket question was formulated as “Would the amount be $E 
                                                 
2 The exact wording of the question was: “About how much did you and your household spend on 
everything in the past month? Please think about all bills such as rent, mortgage loan payments, utility and 
other bills, as well as all expenses such as food, clothing, transportation, entertainment and any other 
expenses you and your household may have.” 
   7
or more in the past month?” with E=500, E=1000 or E=2000. If a respondent answered 
“don’t know” or “refuse” to a bracket question, the sequence was stopped. The other four 
groups (sample II) immediately were given bracket questions, with different entry points 
for the four groups (500, 1000, 2000 and 5000). 
  This sample consists of 4928 observations. About 2.6% of them did not give an 
answer to either an open-ended question or a follow-up or direct bracket question; these 
observations are discarded for the main part of the analysis but will be incorporated in 
Section 6. This leaves 4759 observations.  About 42% of them (sample I) started with an 
open question. Almost two thirds of these gave an open-ended answer (1416 
observations). The remaining 681 gave at least one bracket answer. The first panel of 
Table 1 presents the fractions with consumption less than each of the entry point values 
in the open-ended answers and according to the follow-up bracket answers, separately for 
the three entry point groups. There are several explanations for differences between open-
ended answers and the bracket answers and between bracket answers with different entry 
points. High consumption families could be more concerned about their privacy and less 
willing to give a precise number, i.e., open-ended answers could under-represent high 
amounts (selection into open answers is correlated with consumption level, i.e., missing 
values in open-ended answers are not completely random). Alternatively, respondents 
could make mistakes in either the open-ended answers or in their bracket answers or 
both. In particular, the difference between the distributions of bracket responses for the 
three entry points suggest that some bracket answers may depend on the (randomly 
assigned) entry point. In other words, there is an anchoring problem. Significance levels 
are rather low, however, due to the relatively small numbers of observations. 
   8
 
Table1. Distribution of Consumption in Experimental Data AHEAD 1995 
 
Sample I: open-ended question first 
 
      Sub-sample: 
      Entry point  Entry point  Entry point  All entry points   
      500    1000    2000 
 
observations    674    698    725    2097 
obs. open answer   435    485    496    1416 
(percentage)  (64.5)   (69.5)   (68.4)   (67.5)  
% of open answers       
  < 500    16.6    16.9    17.3    16.9 
  < 1000   46.4    49.7    50.8    49.1 
  < 2000   80.0    81.0    83.3    81.5 
 
obs. bracket answer 239    213    229    681 
(percentage)  (35.5)   (30.5)   (31.6)   (32.5) 
% of bracket answers 
  < 500    19.7    15.2    11.1 
  < 1000   47.4    49.3    40.4 
  < 2000   91.9    85.0    75.1 
 
Sample II: forced brackets 
       
      Sub-sample: 
      Entry point  Entry point  Entry point  Entry point 
      500    1000    2000    5000   
 
observations     690     612     582    778 
% of bracket answers 
  < 500    17.0    11.8     7.6     6.4 
  < 1000   57.0    41.7    31.1    32.2 
  < 2000   86.4    83.5    70.1    65.2   
   < 5000   98.9    98.8    97.4    94.1 
Note: respondents who answer neither an open question nor the first bracket 
question are not included.  
          
  
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows the distributions for the immediate bracket 
respondents by entry point. Again, non-random response behavior might in principle 
explain why the open-ended answers tend to be small compared to the bracket responses. 
A salient feature of the figure is the fact that the distribution shifts with the entry point. In 
this case the numbers of observations are much larger and most of the differences are 
significant. The anchoring models discussed in the previous section provide several 
explanations for these differences. 
There seems to be common agreement in the literature that fixed-point anchoring 
affects the answers to bracket questions from the second bracket question onwards. The 
entry point in the first bracket question acts as an anchor and the respondent’s estimate is   9
pushed towards it. This phenomenon makes intuitive sense and is studied relatively often 
in the literature and is not the issue of the current paper.   Fixed-point anchoring, 
however, does not affect the answer to the first bracket question. In this paper we focus 
on errors in answers to the first bracket questions. We do not analyze the answers to the 
later bracket question, thus avoiding the need to cope with fixed-point anchoring. 
Our nonparametric testing strategy is illustrated in Figure 1, which is largely 
derived from the numbers in Table 1. The solid line is the empirical distribution of open-
ended answers. The other curves use only the answers to the first bracket question to 
estimate the distributions for the samples of immediate bracket respondents and follow-
up bracket respondents. For example, for the immediate bracket respondents, the fraction 
of households with consumption less than $2000 is based upon the group of immediate 
respondents who got $2000 as their entry point. This is the point (20,0.701) on the short-
dashed dash-dotted curve in Figure 1. Similarly, the fraction of households with 
consumption less than $1000 is based upon the sub-sample of immediate bracket 
respondents with entry point $1000, etc.            
The three distributions in Figure 1 will differ if non-response to the open-ended 
question is non-random. If all answers are correct, 81.0% in the sub-sample of sample I 
that gave an open-ended answer have consumption less than $2000, compared to 75.1% 
in the sub-sample who gave a follow-up bracket answer. There is no reason why these 
two numbers should be estimates of the same thing, since whether or not a respondent 
gives an open answer may be correlated with the level of household consumption 
(missing open answers are nonrandom; selective non-response). An estimate for the 
fraction of people with household consumption less than $2000 in the total population of 
interest on the basis of sample I is 0.675*0.81+0.325*0.751=0.791. Under the assumption 
that all answers are correct, this estimate is consistent under any form of selective non-
response between open answers and follow-up bracket answers.
3 The open-ended 
answers (solid curve) might be negatively selected, implying that follow-up bracket 
answers (long-dashed curve) are positively selected.  
                                                 
3 It is assumed that selection does not depend on whether the follow-up bracket questions start with $500, 
$1000 or $2000. This seems quite reasonable since entry points are assigned randomly and people do not 
know their entry point at the time they have to decide whether to give an open answer or not. Moreover, 
this can easily be tested for and is not rejected.     10
The immediate bracket responses are, because of the random assignment, drawn 
from the same population as the combined sample of open-ended and follow-up bracket 
respondents. This implies that, if all answers to open-ended questions and first bracket 
questions are correct, the distribution of immediate bracket respondents should be a 
weighted mean of the other two distributions. Figure 1 suggests this is not the case; the 
point estimate for sample II is only 0.701. In the next section, we develop a formal test 
based upon this intuition that looks at these differences at several entry points.    
 
4. Testing the Fixed-Point Model of Anchoring 
A major distinction between the models discussed in section 2 is their implication for the 
first bracket point. The fixed-point model assumes that the entry point acts as an anchor 
for later bracket questions but does not affect whether the amount is larger or smaller 
than or equal to the first entry point itself, and therefore does not lead to an incorrect 
answer to the first bracket question. In other words, the fixed-point model implies that 
anchoring does not bias the answers to the first bracket question. The same applies to any 
Bayesian model: the first entry point leads to an update of prior information, but will not 
move the mean or any other location measure of the respondent’s subjective distribution 
past the entry point. Thus a Bayesian model will not lead to biased answers to the first 
bracket question.    
  The gating model, on the other hand, assumes that errors can be made at every 
bracket question, including the first one. Explaining the stylized fact that the distribution 
shifts in the direction of the first entry point even requires that the errors made in the first 
question are typically larger than those in the later stages of the unfolding bracket design 
(Hurd et al., 1998). Under plausible distributional assumptions, the gating model implies 
that bracket answers give too high probabilities of both very low outcomes and very high 
outcomes. If Y is consumption, then, according to the gating model, the fraction of “no” 
answers in bracket responses will overestimate P[Y<E] if the entry point E is, for 
example, the first decile of the consumption distribution, and the fraction of “yes” bracket 
responses will overestimate P[Y³E] if E is, for example, the ninth decile. The gating bias 
on the estimate of P[Y<E] is unclear (zero in case of complete symmetry) if E is the 
median.   11
  Since all the questions in the experiment are of the form “Is it E or more?” 
acquiescence bias always goes in one direction: P[Y<E] will be underestimated, P[Y³E] 
will be overestimated, no matter whether E is larger or smaller than (or equal to) the 
median.  
  If samples of open-ended answers and bracket answers drawn randomly from the 
same population would be available, the arguments given above would make it possible 
to test the joint null hypothesis of no acquiescence bias and no anchoring in the first 
bracket question, i.e., anchoring according to the fixed-point model or a Bayesian model, 
but not according to a gating model. Moreover, if this null hypothesis would be rejected, 
looking at what happens at a low entry point would make it possible to say whether yea-
saying or anchoring according to the gating model is the main reason for rejection. If 
there is yea-saying, the bracket answers will lead to a larger estimate of P[Y³E] than the 
open-ended answers whether E is large or small, but if there is gating, the bracket 
answers based estimate of P[Y³E] will be smaller when E is small. 
  The reality of the experiment, however, is slightly more complicated. First, there 
are respondents who do not reveal any information. In the sample of immediate bracket 
respondents (sample II), these are the respondents that do not answer the first bracket 
question. In the sample of those who start with an open-ended question (sample I), some 
people answer neither the open-ended nor the first bracket question in the follow-up 
unfolding brackets design (i.e., they always answer “don’t know” or “refuse”). We will 
assume that the groups of complete non-respondents are the same in the two sub-samples. 
That is, we assume that people who do not answer an initial bracket question would also 
not have answered an open-ended question, and people who do not answer a follow-up 
bracket question would not have answered the same bracket question either if it had been 
preceded by an open-ended question. In other words: the population actually analyzed 
excludes the people who do not reveal any information at all, and we assume that both 
samples (I and II) are random samples from this population. Appendix A presents 
detailed information on complete non-response for each group. It suggests that no 
systematic differences between samples I and II can be detected, backing up the 
assumption that is made. Moreover, in section 6 we show how the assumption can be 
relaxed using Manski bounds (Manski 1989).      12
  Second, there is a substantial number of respondents in sample I who do not 
answer the open-ended question but do answer one or more follow-up bracket questions. 
Whether someone in sample I gives an open-ended answer or a bracket answer may very 
well be non-random, in which case ignoring the bracket respondents in sample I leads to 
selection bias. The bracket responses in sample I may suffer from the same anchoring or 
acquiescence biases as those in sample II. We will combine estimates of P[Y<E]   for 
various (entry point) values of E in the sub-samples of open-ended and bracket 
respondents in sample I and compare them with estimates on sample II. We will only use 
the open answers and the first bracket questions, and not the information in other bracket 
questions:  the latter would suffer from anchoring in any anchoring model, including the 
fixed-point model. Under our null hypothesis, answers to the first bracket question will 
not suffer from anchoring in either group, and the difference between the sample I and II 
based estimates should be insignificant. Under the alternative, both the sample I and the 
sample II based estimates will be biased. Since the majority of the sample I answers are 
open answers, however – which are assumed to be always correct under the null as well 
as the alternative – the bias is expected to be larger in sample II than in sample I. This 
will drive the power of the test and will tell us how to interpret deviations from the null. 
  To make this more precise, some notation is needed. First consider sample I 
(excluding complete non-respondents). Let P[O] denote the probability that an open 
answer is given. For E=500, 1000 or 2000, let P[Y<E|O] be the (population) fraction of 
people with consumption less than E among those who give an open answer.  
Let P[Y <r E|B] be the fraction among initial non-respondents who, if their entry 
point is E,  report that their consumption is less than E. Under the null hypothesis, the 
fraction P[Y <r E|B] is equal to the fraction P[Y < E|B] of initial non-respondents whose 
true consumption level is less than E. Due to selective initial non-response, P[Y < E|B] 
and P[Y<E|O] can be different, so that P[Y <r E|B] and [Y<E|O] can also be different, 
even under the null.  
With the survey design of sample I, the fraction of people who report 
consumption less than E in the whole population (again, excluding full non-respondents, 
as explained above) is equal to 
   13
P[Y<r E|I] = P[O] P[Y<E|O] + (1-P[O]) P[Y <r E|B]. 
 
Under the null hypothesis, this is equal to the fraction of people with actual consumption 
less than E, given by 
 
P[Y< E|I] = P[O] P[Y<E|O] + (1-P[O]) P[Y < E|B]. 
 
  Sample II (excluding full non-respondents) is drawn from the same population. It 
gives a direct estimate of P[Y <r E|II], the probability that someone who gets an initial 
bracket question with entry point E reports that consumption is lower than E. Under the 
null, P[Y<E|II] = P[Y<rE|II]. Since I and II are from the same population, P[Y<E|II] = 
P[Y<E|I] (= P[Y<E], the fraction in the population with consumption below E). Under 
the alternative, both P[Y <r E|I] and P[Y <r E|II] will be different from P[Y<E], and the 
sign of the difference depends on the nature of the alternative and the position of E in the 
distribution of Y. It seems likely that P[Y<r E|I] will then be closer to P[Y<E] than P[Y<r 
E |II], since the bias is attenuated by the open-ended responses (which are assumed to be 
always correct). Thus comparing estimates of P[Y<r E|I] and P[Y<r E|II] will give us an 
idea of the sign of the bias. 
   The easiest way to implement the joint test for the three entry points E=500, 1000 
and 2000 is to formulate the above as a model that can be estimated by maximum 
likelihood and perform a likelihood ratio test. To account for bunching at the entry points 
in the open answers, which is evident in Figure 1, we explicitly estimate mass point 
probabilities for the outcomes 500, 1000 and 2000. The complete unrestricted model has 
thirteen parameters: P[Y<500|O], P[Y=500|O], P[500<Y<1000|O], …. P[Y=2000|O], 
P[Y<r 500|B], P[Y<r 1000|B], P[Y<r 2000|B], P[Y<r 500|II], P[Y<r 1000|II] and P[Y<r 
2000|II]. The three restrictions to be tested are P[Y<r E|II]=P[O]P[Y<E|O]+(1-
P[O])P[Y<r E|B], E=500,1000,2000, where P[Y<1000|O] = P[Y<500|O] + P[Y=500|O] + 
P[500<Y<1000|O], and P[Y<2000|O] is defined similarly.
4 The unrestricted ML 
                                                 
4 We cannot use P[Y<5000] since there is no group of follow-up bracket respondents with entry point 
$5000, making it impossible to estimate P[Y<r 5000|B].        14
estimates are given by the corresponding sub-sample fractions. The restricted estimates 
have to be determined numerically. 
 
5. Results 
Table 2 presents the unrestricted and restricted estimates using the complete samples of 
continuous and bracket respondents.  The null hypothesis is clearly rejected. Comparing 
the implied estimates P[Y<r E|I] with the estimates of P[Y<r E|II] in the unrestricted 
model gives some idea why this is the case. The estimates of P[Y<r 500|I] and P[Y<r 500 
|II] are not significantly different (t-value of the difference: 0.4). The estimate of P[Y<r 
1000|I] is significantly larger than the estimate of P[Y<r 1000|II] (t-value: 2.3). Since this 
entry point is close to the median, it seems implausible that this is due to gating. On the 
other hand, it could very well be due to acquiescence bias, implying that too many people 
give an affirmative answer to the question whether their consumption is at least $1000. 
Similarly, the finding that P[Y<r 2000|I] is significantly larger than the estimate of P[Y<r 
2000|II] (t-value 3.9) could also be due to acquiescence bias. This finding, however, 
would also be in line with gating, since it implies a higher probability of an “extreme” 
outcome (>2000) for bracket answers than for continuous answers. 
Qualitatively, one interpretation of these results seems to be a combination of 
acquiescence bias and gating. The acquiescence bias makes P[Y<r E|II] smaller than 
P[Y<r E|I] for all E. Gating at 500 increases P[Y<r 500|II] more than  P[Y<r 500|I]. Thus 
for E=500, the two effects are opposite and almost cancel, apparently. For E=1000 there 
is no strong gating effect and the acquiescence bias raises P[Y<r E|II] more than P[Y<r 
E|I]. For E=2000, gating and acquiescence bias are in the same direction, explaining why 
in this case, the difference between P[Y<r E|II] and P[Y<r E|I] is particularly large.  
As we will show in Section 7, however, this explanation is likely to be incorrect.  
The effect of acquiescence will automatically be increasing with the entry point, because  
only those whose correct answer is “no” can make an acquiescence error. Few 
respondents have monthly household consumption less than $500 and should answer 
“no” if the entry point is $500, but many more have consumption level less than $2000 
and should answer “no” if the entry point is $2000. If the acquiescence probability is the   15
same for everyone, we can therefore expect more incorrect answers at $2000 than at 
$500.  
  
Table 2: Nonparametric Models: ML estimates   
 
Unrestricted model    Restricted model 
Estimate  St. error    Estimate  St. error      
 
P[O]      0.6752  0.0102    0.6721  0.0103 
 
P[Y<500|O]    0.1695  0.0100    0.1621  0.0088 
P[Y=500|O]    0.0848  0.0074    0.0812  0.0071 
P[500<Y<1000|O]  0.2366  0.0113    0.2276  0.0107 
P[Y=1000|O]   0.1448  0.0094    0.1468  0.0093 
P[1000<Y<2000|O]  0.1794  0.0102    0.1821  0.0101     
P[Y=2000|O]   0.0726  0.0069    0.0813  0.0074   
 
P[Y<r 500|B]   0.1967  0.0257    0.1936  0.0225 
P[Y<r 1000|B]    0.4883  0.0342    0.4451  0.0302 
P[Y<r 2000|B]    0.7511  0.0286    0.6949  0.0276 
 
P[Y<r 500|II]    0.1696  0.0143     
P[Y<r 1000|II]  0.4167  0.0199 
P[Y<r 2000|II]  0.7010  0.0190 
 
Implied estimates: 
P[Y<r 500|I]   0.1783  0.0186    0.1724  0.0168 
P[Y<r 1000|I]    0.4901  0.0253    0.4624  0.0231 
P[Y<r 2000|I]    0.7943  0.0142    0.7654  0.0135 
 
Log likelihood    -5456.57        -5469.49      
 
 
A potential caveat of our analysis might be the way in which we treat the focal 
points in the open-ended answers, particularly since the entry points are also focal points. 
In the approach discussed above, we have taken the answers literally and have used a 
mixed distribution for the open-ended answers. For the bracket answers, we have taken 
“E or more” literally also, including those with consumption exactly equal to E. An 
alternative would be to interpret the open-ended focal point reports as rounded values, 
assuming that the underlying distribution of true consumption values is continuous. This 
would mean that we would have to add about 0.5P[Y=E|O] to P[Y<E|O] before carrying 
out the test. It would lead to even higher values of P[Y<r E|I] and would increase the 
deviations between P[Y<r E|I] and P[Y<r E|II], thus further increasing the value of the   16
test statistic. This would not change the qualitative conclusion of the test, but it would 
make the case for an acquiescence bias even stronger. 
  According to Hurd (1999), acquiescence bias and anchoring become more 
important if respondents are more uncertain about the actual amounts. Hurd (1999) 
analyzes experimental data on asset holdings, and finds that the answers of the financial 
respondent – the person in the household who is more knowledgeable in financial matters 
and answers most of the financial questions – are hardly subject to acquiescence bias, 
while for others, acquiescence bias is quite prominent. We can check whether this also 
applies to consumption by considering financial respondents (almost 75% of the sample) 
and other respondents separately. 
 
Table 3. Unrestricted estimates for Financial respondents and Others 
 
      Financial respondents  Others 
      Estimate  St. Error  Estimate  St. Error 
 
P[O]      0.6941  0.0116  0.6176  0.0214   
 
P[Y<500|O]    0.1934  0.0119  0.0875  0.0158 
P[Y=500|O]    0.0830  0.0083  0.0906  0.0160 
P[500<Y<1000|O]  0.2500  0.0131  0.1906  0.0220 
P[Y=1000|O]   0.1369  0.0104  0.1719  0.0211 
P[1000<Y<2000|O]  0.1779  0.0116  0.1844  0.0217 
P[Y=2000|O]   0.0602  0.0072  0.1156  0.0179 
 
P[Y<r 500|B]   0.2485  0.0336  0.0811  0.0317 
P[Y<r 1000|B]    0.5267  0.0408  0.3968  0.0616 
P[Y<r 2000|B]    0.7857  0.0312  0.6557  0.0608 
 
P[Y<r 500|II]    0.2070  0.0179  0.0618  0.0180 
P[Y<r 1000|II]  0.4773  0.0232  0.2282  0.0344 
P[Y<r 20000|II]  0.7346  0.0211  0.6000  0.0407 
 
Implied estimates: 
P[Y<r 500|I]   0.2103  0.0248  0.0850  0.0219 
P[Y<r 1000|I]    0.5265  0.0308  0.3795  0.0422 
P[Y<r 2000|I]    0.8243  0.0166  0.6985  0.0269 
  
Log likelihood 
Unrestricted  -4115.58      -1274.89      
Restricted    -4123.86      -1282.15           
   17
  The estimates of the unrestricted model and the restricted likelihood for both 
groups are presented in Table 3. The underlying distributions are obviously different:  all 
nonfinancial respondents are married and therefore are in high consumption households, 
on average, whereas some financial respondents are single and therefore more often  in 
low consumption households. The probability of a focal point answer is smaller for 
financial respondents than for others, already suggesting that financial respondents are 
less uncertain about their consumption levels than others. However, the null hypothesis of 
neither gating nor acquiescence bias is rejected for both financial respondents and others. 
The deviations between estimates of P[Y<r E|I] and P[Y<r E|II] are similar for the 
smallest and largest entry points E=$500 and E=$2000. The t-statistics on these 
differences are 0.1 and 0.8 at E=$500, and 3.3 and 2.0 at E=$2000, for financial 
respondents and others, respectively. Only for the intermediate entry point E=$1000, it 
seems that the (acquiescence) bias is smaller for financial respondents than for others. 
Here the t-test does not reject equality for financial respondents (t-statistic 1.3), while it 
does reject equality for others (t-statistic 2.8).   
 
6. Relaxing the Assumptions about Full Non-response 
Until now we have assumed that there is no selective complete non-response, i.e., the 
respondents in sample I who neither give an open-ended nor a bracket answer have the 
same consumption distribution as the respondents in sample II who do not give any 
bracket answers. In this section we will investigate whether the result obtained above 
could be due to that assumption instead of to acquiescence and/or gating. 
  There are several types of non-response. First, the experimental module is given 
to the respondents at the end of the interview, and before it starts, respondents are 
explicitly asked whether they are willing to cooperate. About 19.2% of all respondents 
are not willing to cooperate and thus do not answer any of the questions in the 
experimental module. Since this selection takes place before respondents know which 
experimental module they are assigned to (and do not know whether they will be in 
sample I or sample II), it seems quite reasonable that this selection is not systematically 
different for the two samples. It may mean that both samples are no longer representative   18
of the population we would ultimately be interested in but will not invalidate the test 
discussed in the previous sections. 
  Of the remaining respondents, 0.87% stop somewhere during the experimental 
module, before coming to the consumption questions (0.83% in sample I, 0.94% in 
sample II). The samples are split into seven sub-samples (three in sample I, four in 
sample II) that do not get exactly the same questions, but there seems to be no reason for 
any systematic difference between samples I and II. It thus seems reasonable to treat 
these non-respondents to the consumption questions in the same way as those who did 
not want to participate in the modules. Since they stop before they know which 
consumption questions they will get, we will assume that their consumption distributions 
are not systematically different for the two samples. 
  We can therefore condition on not opting out before the consumption questions 
start and focus on the third type of full non-response. In sample I, 2.37% of all 
respondents answer “don’t know” or “refuse” to the open-ended consumption question 
and subsequently also answer “don’t know” or “refuse” to the first follow-up bracket 
question. In sample II, 2.74% answer “don’t know” or “refuse” to the first bracket 
question. Since the survey designs are systematically different here – an open-ended 
question first versus forced brackets – selection into full non-response might be different 
for the two samples. We will now check whether such differences could explain the test 
results in the previous section. 
  Without further assumptions, even under the null hypothesis of correct answers 
only, the probability P[Y<E] is no longer identified if full non-respondents are included 
in the population. The reason is that nothing is known about the values of Y for the full 
non-respondents. We can, however, apply Manski (1989, 1995) to obtain upper and lower 
bounds for the probabilities. In that way we can, under the null hypothesis, construct 
intervals for P[Y<E] on the basis of I and II. Under the null hypothesis these intervals 
should both contain the common value P[Y<E]. To take account of sampling uncertainty, 
we will construct confidence bands for the lower and upper bounds of the intervals and 
thus construct intervals that contain the Manski bounds with at least 95% confidence. The 
test will then be based upon comparing the intervals based upon samples I and II.   19
  To make this more precise some notation needs to be introduced. For sample I, 
there are three types of response behavior, open-ended (O), bracket (B) or none at all (N), 
with probabilities P[O|I], P[B|I] and P[N|I]=1-P[O|I]-P[B|I]. The probabilities that were 
used in the previous section were conditional on giving some response, i.e., on not N. 
Under the null hypothesis that all bracket answers are correct, Table 2 thus gives the 
estimates (with standard errors in parentheses) 0.1783 (0.0186), 0.4901 (0.0253) and 
0.7943 (0.0142) of P[Y<E|not N, I], for E=500, 1000 and 2000, respectively. The 
probabilities that are not conditional upon some response are P[Y<E|I] = (1-
P[N|I])P[Y<E|not N,I] + P[N|I]P[Y<E|N,I]. Without further assumptions, nothing is 
known about P[Y<E|N,I], except of course that it is between 0 and 1. Using this gives the 
Manski bounds on P[Y<E|I]: 
 
     (1-P[N|I])P[Y<E|not N,I] 3><(_,@-P[N|I])P[Y<E|not N,I] +P[N|I]                    
 
Similarly, the following Manski bounds can be derived for sample II: 
 
     (1-P[N|II])P[Y<E|not N,II] 3><(_,,@-P[N|II])P[Y<E|not N,II] +P[N|II]                    
 
Applying this to the entry points E=500, 1000 and 2000 gives the following point 
estimates of the Manski bounds: 
 
    Sample I    sample II     
E=500   [0.1741; 0.1978]  [0.1650; 0.1924] 
E=1000  [0.4785; 0.5022]  [0.4053; 0.4327] 
E=2000  [0.7755; 0.7992]  [0.6818; 0.7092] 
   
First, consider E=500. The two intervals overlap. If all full non-respondents in sample I 
have consumption below $500 and all full non-respondents in sample II have 
consumption above $500, the sample I estimate is 0.1978 and the sample II estimate is 
0.1650. If both assumptions are reversed, the estimates are 0.1741 and 0.1924. Many 
intermediate cases can be thought of for which the two estimates are identical. We   20
already concluded in Section 5 that the difference at $500 can also be explained from 
sampling uncertainty – under the assumption that selection into full non-response was the 
same, the point estimates are not significantly different. Thus at E=$500, the current 
exercise does not add much. 
  Now consider E=$1000. Here the two intervals do not overlap. Even if all full 
non-respondents in sample II have low consumption and all full non-respondents in 
sample I have high consumption, the estimate for sample II (0.4327) remains below that 
for sample II (0.4785). If there were no sampling uncertainty, this would mean that the 
null hypothesis should be rejected (at the zero significance level). Of course there is 
sampling uncertainty, and the question thus becomes whether the upper bound for sample 
II is significantly lower than the lower bound for sample I. The standard error on the 
difference between these two can be derived along the same lines as in the previous 
section and appears to be about 0.033, giving a t-value of about 1.4. In other words, if we 
are willing to assume that full non-respondents in the two samples are completely 
opposite groups (low consumption versus high consumption), and only consider entry 
point E=$1000, then we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all reports are correct at the 
5% (or even 10%) two-sided significance level.        
  Similarly, considering the entry point E=$2000, the question becomes whether the 
upper bound for sample II (0.7092) is significantly different from the lower bound for 
sample I (0.7755). In this case, the standard deviation on the difference is about 0.025 
and the t-value on the difference becomes 2.6. That is, the null hypothesis of correct 
reports only can be rejected at the 5% level, even if we allow for opposite selection into 
full non-response in samples I and II. Maintaining the assumption that the open-ended 
answers are correct, this provides evidence of anchoring or acquiescence bias in the 
bracket answers. The evidence is quite strong in the sense that any type of selection into 
full non-response is allowed for, even the most extreme – and obviously not very 
plausible – case that all non-respondents in one group are from low consumption (i.e., 
lower than $2000 per month) families while all non-respondents in the other group are 
from high consumption families. Imposing more assumptions on response behavior (such 
as monotonicity, see Manski 1989) will make the test more powerful and reinforce the 
result.    21
  We conclude that the non-respondents cannot explain the variation by entry point, 
and that a role remains for gating and acquiescence bias.  
 
7. Fixed Probability Gating and Acquiescence  
To investigate more formally whether gating or acquiescence bias (or both) can indeed 
explain why the null hypothesis is rejected, the model can be extended with a simple 
form of gating and acquiescence bias, using fixed probabilities of acquiescence and 
gating. We go back to the assumptions in sections 4 and 5 about full non-response and 
consider the subpopulation of respondents who provide either open-ended or bracket 
information. First, we assume that there is a fixed fraction of the population that will 
automatically answer a bracket question with “yes,” irrespective of the true amount and 
the entry point. Second, we assume that in the rest of the population there is a fixed 
probability P(Gat) that people give the wrong answer (“yes” if Y<E or “no” if Y E).
5  
With these two additions to the nonparametric model, the probability that a random 
person in the population answers “yes” if the true consumption amount is less than E, is 
given by P(Acq) + (1-P(Acq))P(Gat) where P(Acq) is the probability the person is the 
acquiescent type.  The probability that someone answers “no” if the true amount is at 
least E, is given by (1-P(Acq))P(Gat). For the symmetric case with P(Acq)=0, this model 
is essentially the same as what Copas (1988, p.234) calls “a simple model for resistant 
fitting.” The general case is similar to the misclassification models used by, for example, 
Ekholm and Palmgren (1982), Lee and Porter (1984) or Hausman et al. (1998).
6   
Adding these features to the unrestricted model gives a model with one parameter 
less than the unrestricted model, thus imposing one restriction in the general model. This 
restriction is not rejected by a likelihood ratio test: the log likelihood of the new model is 
–5456.91, close to the log likelihood of the unrestricted model in Table 2. The results of 
                                                 
5 With just one observation we cannot distinguish this model of heterogeneity from one in which everyone 
in the population has a combination of gating and acquiescence errors such that 
P(“yes”|Y<E)>P(“no”|Y>E)>0.  For convenience of exposition we adopt the heterogeneity model. 
6 The current model is less general than the models in the literature in the sense that yea-saying works in 
only one direction and makes the probability or reporting a “yes” where “no” would be correct larger than 
the probability of reporting “no” where “yes” would be correct, but this inequality restriction appears not to 
be binding.         
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this intermediate model are presented in Table 4. The estimates of P(Gat) and P(Acq) 
suggest that the latter is much more important than the former: the estimate of the gating 
probability is 0.018 with standard error 0.039, while the acquiescence probability is 0.170 
with standard error 0.037. 
To explain why the fixed acquiescence probability works well in spite of the 
seemingly different biases at the three entry points (revealed by Table 1), consider some 
of the results of the model with fixed acquiescence probability but without gating. In this 
model, the estimate of P(Acq) is 0.176 (with standard error 0.035) . The estimated 
fraction of people with (true) consumption less than $500 is 0.196. The acquiescence bias 
in the sample of forced bracket respondents is therefore estimated to be 
0.196*0.176=0.034. In sample I, it is about one third as large (since one third goes to 
brackets). This would therefore lead to a difference of about 2.3 % points between 
samples I and II. At entry point $1000, the estimated acquiescence bias in sample II 
would be 0.519*0.176=0.091, leading to a 6.0%-points difference between samples I and 
II. At entry point $2000, the difference would be about two thirds of 0.847*0.176=0.149, 
i.e., about 10.0%-points. These differences are so close to the observed differences in the 
data that the null hypothesis that this simple model is correctly specified cannot be 
rejected. 
The other panels of Table 4 present the models with either fixed probability 
gating or fixed probability acquiescence. In the model without fixed probability 
acquiescence, the gating probability is much larger than if acquiescence is also allowed 
for. This model is misspecified, however. In the model without gating, the acquiescence 
probability is close to its estimate if gating is also allowed for, as are all the other 
parameters. All this  suggests that acquiescence alone might explain the anomalies in the 
data. In any case, it can explain the result of the nonparametric tests. 
Figure 2 compares the implications for the distribution of consumption of the 
three models in Table 4 and the restricted “benchmark” model without gating or 
acquiescence in the right hand panel of Table 2. Compared to the benchmark model, the 
model allowing for gating only implies a smaller dispersion in the distribution of 
consumption. This is because part of the “extreme” bracket answers (“no” at E=$500; 
“yes” at E=$2000) are explained by gating rather than true low or high consumption   23
values. While the benchmark model estimates just reflect the observed data, the gating 
model recognizes that part of the large dispersion in the observed data is due to gating, 
and produces a less dispersed picture of the true consumption values. The differences are 
small, however. 
Larger differences arise when acquiescence is allowed for. In this case, allowing 
for gating in addition makes no difference – the two curves are virtually the same. But 
both imply lower true values of consumption than the models without acquiescence. The 
explanation is clear: in the models allowing for yea-saying, some of the “yes” answers to 
the bracket questions are explained as yea-saying instead of necessarily reflecting high 
consumption values. Thus the model with yea-saying can explain the large number of  
“yes” answers without high underlying consumption values. 
  The difference can also be explained in terms of selection into open-ended 
answers versus bracket response (full non-response is ignored). Although we have not 
made the relation between consumption level and willingness to respond to the open-
ended answer explicit yet, the model certainly allows us to do so. Using Bayes rule, the 
probability of giving an open-ended answer (in the survey design of sample I) given that 
consumption is lower than the entry point level E can be written as: 
 
  P[O|Y<E] = P[O]P[Y<E|O]/(P[O]P[Y<E|O] + {1-P[O]}P[Y<E|B]) 
 
All the probabilities on the right hand side can be computed directly from the estimates in 
Table 2 or Table 4. For the benchmark (restricted) model in Table 2 we get, for example, 
an estimate of 0.684 for P[O|Y<1000]. This is somewhat higher than the estimate of P[O] 
which is 0.672. Thus the benchmark model would imply a small (and insignificant) 
selection effect, which is positive in the sense that the higher consumption values have 
higher probability of self-selection in the bracket  
questions.  
According to the most general model in Table 4, however, we get an estimate of 
0.638 for P[O|Y<1000], which is much lower than the estimate of 0.675 for P[O]. Thus 
the model allowing for acquiescence implies negative selection: respondents with low 
consumption  more often become bracket respondents. The many “yes” responses in the   24
(follow-up) bracket answers do not always reflect high consumption but can partly be 
explained by yea-saying. The distinction between the two explanations is identified 
because of the group of forced bracket respondents, which is not subject to selection 
effects.   
 
Table 4. Models with Fixed Acquiescence and/or Gating Probabilities 
 
                     Gating and      Gating only     Acquiescence 
                  Acquiescence                    only 
                 Est.    S.e.    Est.    S.e.    Est.     S.e. 
 
P[O]             0.6753* 0.0102  0.6739* 0.0103   0.6752* 0.0102 
 
P[Y<500|O]       0.1695* 0.0100  0.1578* 0.0091   0.1709* 0.0096 
P[Y=500|O]       0.0843* 0.0073  0.0823* 0.0072   0.0841* 0.0073 
P[500<Y<1000|O]  0.2352* 0.0111  0.2298* 0.0109   0.2348* 0.0111 
P[Y=1000|O]      0.1456* 0.0093  0.1475* 0.0094   0.1452* 0.0093 
P[1000<Y<2000|O] 0.1804* 0.0102  0.1828* 0.0103   0.1800* 0.0101 
P[Y=2000|O]      0.0727* 0.0069  0.0785* 0.0073   0.0727* 0.0069 
 
P[Y<500|B]       0.2308* 0.0511  0.1262* 0.0435   0.2490* 0.0310 
P[Y<1000|B]      0.5771* 0.0511  0.4356* 0.0351   0.5798* 0.0494 
P[Y<2000|B]      0.9253* 0.0667  0.7441* 0.0424   0.9141* 0.0599 
 
P[Gating]        0.0178  0.0391  0.0659* 0.0313   0 
P[Acquiescence]  0.1703* 0.0371  0                0.1760* 0.0349 
 
log likelihood     -5456.91        -5467.29         -5457.01 
 
Implied estimates: 
P[Y<500]         0.1894  0.0344  0.1475 0.0295    0.1962  0.0222 
P[Y<1000]        0.5176  0.0356  0.4587 0.0261    0.5190  0.0346 
P[Y<2000]        0.8508  0.0142  0.7819 0.0138    0.8472  0.0141 
                                                                     
 
Prior findings in the literature suggest that acquiescence bias should vary with the amount 
of uncertainty a subject has about the quantities being queried.  Table 5, shows the results 
of estimating the  model of Table 4 but with acquiescence probabilities only.  The 
estimations are over a number of sub-samples.  For example, we find an acquiescence 
probability of 0.147 among financial respondents only. In almost all cases the estimated 
acquiescence probability is substantial and its 95% confidence interval does not contain 
the value zero. There is some variation across subgroups, but this variation is not very 
large and usually insignificant, because of the smaller numbers of observations (and   25
perhaps also the non-parametric nature of the approach). Still, most of the findings are in 
line with the notion that people who are more uncertain have a larger probability of 
acquiescence.  
 
Table 5. Estimated Probabilities of Acquiescence   
   (Model with fixed acquiescence probability, without gating) 
subsample      # obs.    P[Acquiescence]       
        Estimate  St. error 
Financial respondent    3548    0.147    0.036     
Not financial respondent  1211    0.311    0.095 
Borne after 1919    2088    0.190    0.059 
Borne before 1920    2671    0.171    0.042 
Woman      3111    0.187    0.041 
Man        1648    0.182    0.064 
Years education >12    1445    0.138    0.081 
Years education £12    3314    0.170    0.036 
High household income
a  2380    0.173    0.061 
Low household income  2379    0.134    0.035 
High household wealth
a  2380    0.222    0.061 
Low household wealth  2379    0.133    0.037 
Self-rated memory high
b  1494    0.072    0.069   
Self-rated memory low  3265    0.226    0.042 
Memory test high
c    1943    0.120    0.059 
Memory test low    3016    0.193    0.042 
All        4759    0.176    0.035 
Notes: 
aHigh and low household income and wealth: above or below median; missing income 
and wealth values imputed (RAND version C of HRS/AHEAD); wealth is total wealth 
(including housing and IRAs). 
bSelf-rated memory: Answer to “How would you rate your memory at the present time?” 
Possible answers: excellent, very good, good, fair or poor. High is defined as excellent or 
very good. 
cMemory test: number of words immediately recalled from a list of 40 words that are read 
to the respondent. High is defined as at least 6 (the maximum was 10).       
 
For example, financial respondents and respondents with high education level are less 
subject to yea-saying than others. Using either a self-reported indicator or a test-based 
indicator of memory quality, we find that people with better memory are less subject to 
yea-saying. There is hardly any relation between age or gender and the tendency of yea-
saying. The income and wealth patterns seem somewhat surprising, with the higher   26
income and higher wealth respondents more subject to yea-saying. As said before, 
however, significance levels are low. Only the difference between those with low and 
high self-rated memory skills is close to significant at the conventional two-sided 5% 
level (t-value 1.91).





In this study, we have investigated the importance of gating and acquiescence bias at the 
entry point of an unfolding bracket design. Experimental data on consumption where 
respondents are randomly either first given an open-ended question on household 
consumption or immediately directed to bracket questions were used to test whether these 
phenomena are present without making any model assumptions. The main finding is that 
some bias is present even at the entry point. Further analysis – making additional 
assumptions on the nature of acquiescence and gating – suggests that acquiescence bias is 
the main problem, while gating is less important. For the consumption question at hand, 
ignoring acquiescence leads to misleading conclusions on the selective nature of item 
non-response and on the inference on the distribution of consumption when selective item 
non-response is taken into account. It would lead to overestimation of consumption levels 
and underestimation of poverty rates. 
  Reducing acquiescence bias in data collection is easy: the bracket questions can 
be formulated in a neutral way, asking people to choose a category rather than answering 
“yes” or “no”. This has already been implemented in the most recent waves of, for 
example, the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and AHEAD. The results of this study 
suggest that, with these improved questions, it seems at least safe to use the first bracket 
question in an unfolding bracket design at face value. Given the evidence in the literature 
that anchoring is a problem also in absence of acquiescence bias, this at the same time 
means that anchoring at follow up bracket questions must be taken seriously. The fixed 
point model for anchoring – or another model with Bayesian learning – in which answers 
to the later bracket questions are affected by the entry point may then be a useful tool.  
                                                 
7 Since the estimates are based upon two independent samples, the standard deviation of the difference is 
the square root of the sum of the squared standard deviations of the two estimates.     27
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Figure 1. Cumulative Distributions of Monthly Consumption (on logarithmic scale) 
Open-ended responses (sample I); 
Follow-up bracket responses using entry point question only (sample I); 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Consumption According to Models with and without Fixed 
Probability Gating and Acquiescence 
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Appendix A: Details on the Consumption Data and on Complete Non-Response 
 
Table A1 explains how many respondents were willing and not willing to answer the 
experimental modules. About 19.2% of all respondents did not participate. 
 
Table A1: Willingness to cooperate in experimental modules 
      
Module and entry point      |      Willing     Not willing 
----------------------------+----------------------------- 
1.Open-ended; E=2000        |        746          194 
2.Open-ended; E=500         |        695          199 
3.Forced bracket; E=1000    |        636          174  
4.Forced bracket; E=5000    |        801          141  
5.Forced bracket; E=500     |        720          171 
6.Forced bracket; E=2000    |        605          139   
7.Open-ended; E=1000        |        725          155   
----------------------------+----------------------------- 
 
Table A2 gives an overview of complete item non-response in the consumption question. 
It concerns respondents who were willing to answer the questions in the experimental 
module. Those who were not willing are excluded; there cannot be any difference in 
selection between the groups there, since these respondents refused to do the 
experimental module before they knew the questions. 
 
Table A2: Response and non-response counts and percent distribution;  
All respondents 
 
Module and entry 
point 
Type of Response 
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  Groups 3,4,5 and 6 immediately go to the bracket questions. Those who do not 
answer the first bracket question are coded as 98 (DK/RF); no distinction between DK 
(don’t know) and RF (refuse) is made. There are also some people who have not given 
any answer to the first (or other) bracket questions; their answer to the bracket question is 
coded as missing, coded as –1 in Table A2.  They dropped out during the module, before 
coming to the consumption questions. 
  Groups 1,2 and 7 first get an open-ended question. Those who answer DK and 
then answer DK/RF at the first bracket question are given misc_b1=8; those who answer 
RF to the continuous question and then answer DK/RF to the first bracket question get 
misc_b1=9. Some people have a missing value for this question (as well as the first 
bracket question); they get misc_b1=-1. (This might apply to people in nursing homes for 
whom the consumption question is skipped.) All those for whom either continuous or 
bracket information is available get misc_b1=0. 
  The results show that complete item non-response varies between 2.8% in group 1 
and 3.8% in group 6. The differences between the groups are small, and there seem to be 
no systematic differences between the continuous groups (1,2,7) and the immediate 
bracket respondents (3,4,5,6). 
  In Tables A3 and A4, the same thing is done for financial respondents and non-
financial respondents separately. Complete non-response is somewhat more common for 
non-financial respondents, but the differences are small. Neither for financial respondents 
nor for non-financial respondents, it seems possible to detect any systematic pattern or a 
relation between complete non-response and whether a continuous question is asked first. 
 
Table A3: Response and non-response counts and percent distribution;  
Financial respondents 
 
Module and entry 
point 
Type of Response 
 

































































































Table A4: Response and non-response counts and percent distribution;  
Non-financial respondents 
 
Module and entry 
point 
Type of Response 
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